Ukrainian Air Force spokesman on Operation Spider's Web: Even one aircraft lost is a major blow for Russia

1 June 2025 was a dark day for Russian aviation. A total of 117 FPV drones of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), controlled by 117 pilots, attacked four Russian strategic air bases.

The SSU reported that 41 Russian aircraft suffered varying degrees of damage (this figure has yet to be confirmed by independent sources or satellite image services).

Of those, 13 burned out, the SSU says.

In any case, there is no prospect of Russia having the same fleet that it had prior to 1 June 2025  in the foreseeable future.

Colonel Yurii Ihnat, head of communications for the Air Force, calculated for Ukrainska Pravda that the Russian strategic aircraft hit by the SSU drones had launched 2,437 cruise missiles – Kh-101s, Kh-555s and Kh-55s – on Ukraine. He said at least 500 missiles from those carriers had reached their targets.

The head of the SSU, Vasyl Maliuk, who led the operation codenamed Pavutyna (Spider’s Web), announced that 34% of Russia’s strategic aircraft had been destroyed.

Will this reduce the number of air attacks that Russia has been carrying out on Ukrainians since the beginning of the full-scale invasion?

In this interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Yurii Ihnat reveals what Operation Pavutyna means for Ukraine, how the armed forces are responding to the build-up and modernisation of Russian Shahed drones and how best to counteract them, and discusses Russia’s largest aerial attack in terms of quantity.

"The aircraft won’t be able to perform any operations, i.e. terrorist attacks, on Ukraine for a long time"

What does the Ukrainian strike on Russian strategic airfields mean, apart from being an event with huge shock value? The destruction of the Moskva cruiser ultimately led Russia to relocate its Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol to the cramped bay of Novorossiysk. As a result, the Russian fleet has been largely absent from the current phase of the war. Can we expect Ukraine’s attack on Russian strategic airfields to have a similar impact?

These events were all the first of their kind. The flagship of the Russian fleet, the Moskva, sank to the bottom of the sea, and that was followed by other significant events such as the destruction of the first A-50, then the first A-50U. These were unique operations conducted jointly by different defence forces. Long-range A-50 radar detection aircraft did not appear in the Black Sea or on our northern borders in Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod oblasts for many months. According to SSU information, another of these aircraft was destroyed as a result of the Ukrainian drone attack.

The number of upgraded Russian A-50s could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Because of them, Russia was able to conduct extensive radar reconnaissance hundreds of kilometres deep into Ukraine that gave them precious information on the presence of our aircraft in the air, aerial attacks, and our air defence systems. The loss of one of these aircraft is a major blow. But aside from this, we have also attacked the airfields.

Ukraine’s Security Service reports that over 40 aircraft were damaged. The extent of the damage will vary: some of the aircraft are completely burnt out, some have been damaged permanently, some may be damaged but can be repaired. They won’t be able to perform any operations, i.e. terrorist attacks, on Ukraine for a long time. Russian forces have been using strategic aircraft since the earliest days of the full-scale invasion in February 2022: Tu-22M3 long-range aircraft, and Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic aircraft.

According to the data that I prepared specifically for Ukrainska Pravda, Russian forces have launched 2,437 cruise missiles – Kh-101s, Kh-555s and Kh-55s – on Ukraine from these carriers since the start of the full-scale invasion. Of these, 1,916 were shot down. This is the result of the highly effective work of air defence, by all the defence forces, on cruise missiles. Nevertheless, a considerable number – about 500 – reached their targets or were not shot down.

The SSU also hit Tu-22M3 bombers carrying Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles. More than 400 such missiles have been launched, and only a few have been intercepted by air defence. Because the Kh-22 is one of the most powerful missiles, it has more than 900 kg of warhead. It’s also one of the least accurate missiles. It’s nicknamed the "aircraft carrier killer", since its purpose is to attack groups of aircraft carriers. Russia has repeatedly attacked densely populated cities, inflicting immense harm on the civilian population. This particular missile has claimed many victims.

"Out of 100 Tu-22M3s, about 40 are capable of performing tasks"

Is it true that Russia usually has no more than half of its fleet operational – and that therefore the 34% of Russia’s strategic aircraft that SSU head Vasyl Maliuk says was hit, or even the 10% claimed by those sceptical about the operation, actually represents a far more serious blow to Russian airpower? What do we know about how many aircraft were operational and how many are beyond repair?

Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 aircraft used to be in service in Ukraine. In various years, under different circumstances, we transferred some to Russia; that’s how it was back then. Unfortunately, today they are launching missile attacks on Ukraine. Probably some of these aircraft were hit when the SSU drones struck.

The aircraft were manufactured during the Soviet era to stand up to the West with the so-called nuclear triad. Not all of them were capable of performing tasks: we counted that a little over 10 Tu-95s and, possibly, Tu-160 aircraft were attacking Ukraine. They can take up to eight missiles under the wing, if we’re talking about the Tu-95. The Tu-160 can take more. But they don’t take that load anyway, because there’s a limit on the number of missiles that can be used. They can’t launch everything on Ukraine at the same time.

Of the 19 Tu-160s, about 10-12 were in good condition. Of the 57 Tu-95s, 36 were in good condition. Of the 100 Tu-22M3s, about 40 were capable of performing tasks.

Did we only hit serviceable planes?

In Russia, there are not many airfields where strategic aircraft can be based – about four or five, maximum six. Not every airfield can take such large aircraft, service them and get them ready for departure. Therefore, their movements are controlled, monitored.

And it’s good that we receive information from our NATO partners about Russia’s preparations for strikes. There is time to put our air defence forces on high alert.

What do we know about Russia’s practical steps in response to the Ukrainian attack on their strategic airfields? President Zelenskyy has warned of a possible air attack. Are there any threatening manoeuvres by Russian aviation?

Let’s separate out the different types of aviation. There’s the type that operates directly at the front, to tactical depth. That hasn’t stopped. Su-30s, Su-35s and Su-34s have been dropping guided aerial bombs on the Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts; they’ve been pretty active today as well [the interview was recorded on 2 June 2025– Ukrainska Pravda].

What threatening actions could strategic aircraft take? They could fly to the launch area in Russia’s Saratov Oblast and launch missiles from there.

A threat is when there is information that aircraft are likely to be equipped with missiles, or weapons are delivered to airfields of temporary or permanent deployment. Then it is threatening for us; we should expect attacks. So far, there are no clear signals.

In any case, it’s clear that Russia has the means. Not all of Russia’s strategic aircraft were destroyed. So both the defence forces and the Air Force have to be as careful as possible. And of course, so do our citizens. You can see what the reaction’s been like in Russia, the threats their propagandists have been coming out with, the reactions and calls for action on social media…

"We looked at a map of Ukraine. It was covered in red specks – the markers that denote aerial targets"

How did the Ukrainian Air Force withstand an attack of almost 500 Shaheds across Ukraine on the night of [Sunday] 1 June? That was believed to be almost the upper limit that Ukraine’s air defence can fight off.

A record number was launched on Sunday night – 479 aerial weapons. Cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, Shahed attack UAVs and interceptor drones. That’s a massive amount. More than 200 aerial targets were shot down; the rest disappeared from radar or were jammed by electronic warfare.

When our forces on duty looked at the map of Ukraine, it was covered in red specks – the markers indicating aerial targets.

I would have liked to have achieved better results, but there were dozens of hits.

The Russians used a tactic that we’ve already mentioned: using a large number of weapons on one target and diving from a great height.

At today’s meeting of the Air Force [on 2 June 2025 – Ukrainska Pravda], the commander and sub-commanders were insistent that drone air defence must be strengthened.

We are talking about anti-aircraft drones that help intercept aerial targets. Crews are being trained in different locations across Ukraine. New units will be introduced.

Previously, drone-based air defence was mostly used by the Ground Forces, as they needed to address the problem of reconnaissance drones hovering by the dozen or even hundred over the front line. But now, reconnaissance UAVs are also being detected deep inside the country. Besides the fact that Shahed drones, of course, attack every night. So the development of anti-aircraft drones, combined with the timely development of air defence drones, will yield ever higher numbers.

"We hammer them with bombs as well. Our aircraft are working every day"

How would you sum up this latest period of intensified hostilities, the start of the summer campaign? What do you need to focus on?

There really has been a serious intensification of enemy activity. If we’re talking about the Air Force, we can see how many aerial attacks it carries out every day. Sumy Oblast is now mostly being attacked by guided bombs, which go 20-25 km deep. They may not be accurate, but there are a lot of them.

We hammer the enemy with aerial bombs as well; our aircraft are working every day, launching missiles, anti-radar missiles of various types that can hit targets, and guided bombs of US-French manufacture.

Unlike Russian guided aerial bombs, are they precision weapons?

They are very high-precision weapons; the pilots rate them very highly. They say they hit within a radius of one metre, exactly on target.

What were the most significant targets hit in May?

Command posts. These are UAV control points – it’s vital to destroy them these days. You see, the use of unmanned aircraft is increasing, various types of drone with which we, and unfortunately Russia, are attacking effectively. So this is a very important objective. Other infrastructure facilities are also attacked, such as ammunition depots, equipment – whatever the superiors order us to hit, so to speak. Intelligence works, everything is destroyed.

But Russia uses almost 10 times more guided aerial bombs to attack us. There are so many of them that they can wipe a settlement off the face of the earth with the pressure tactics that they started back in Avdiivka. If you remember, they were dropping 200 guided aerial bombs a day there. That was a lot at the time. And now we’re seeing this almost constantly on the front line. This is an increase in hostilities. And in this way, Russia conducts strikes with those bombs and other weapons; there are still unguided rockets etc. being used.

Along with this, as you said, our rear is being attacked. That’s the overnight attacks by Shaheds and decoy drones – more than 3,800 targets were destroyed by air defence in May. This is an achievement by all the defence forces, not just the Air Force.

"Messages about aircraft losses must be put into perspective"

Aircraft usually used to operate in the rear, protecting peaceful cities from Kalibrs, Iskanders and so on. Now the presence of aircraft has also been felt on the front line when they started striking Russian forces. Will the air force group there be reinforced?

Yes. If we’re speaking strictly about the grouping, I'd like to take a slightly broader view, because right now, we are heavily dependent on people. There’s a shortage of personnel in the brigades. We can see the information campaign being waged against the military enlistment offices – it's nothing short of disgraceful… That is unacceptable. Society needs to understand who the real enemy is and who isn't. That's obvious.

We've already lost three F-16s.

Yes. With such intense fighting, losses are to be expected. But the buildup is underway. We are receiving Western equipment, we're getting aircraft, and we now have F-16s.

These aircraft must be used effectively. We understand that the equipment we receive has already been in service. It's not brand new. But it's better than the Soviet-era weapons we had. This is more advanced weaponry.

An aircraft is a platform. Beyond that, what matters is what it carries under its wings and what radar it has.

The radar must have long-range vision, the missile must fly far and hit accurately. Ideally, in the final phase of flight – fire and forget. The active homing head must independently seek out the Russian aircraft, and so on.

Unfortunately, Russia currently has aircraft with greater radar range and missiles with longer reach – even compared to the F-16. They also have powerful air defences that operate alongside their aircraft. If we're talking about the MiG-29 or Su-27, there's no comparison at all.

Before we had the F-16s, the ratio between our grouping and theirs was 1 to 10 in terms of our MiGs. And technologically, it's like comparing a Makarov pistol to a sniper rifle. Despite this, our pilots fought back.

There’s been a lot of talk about anti-Shahed "super-technology" recently. People are expressing ideas about making wider use of light aircraft and drone interceptors. Does the Air Force have a clear understanding of which weapons might be most effective against Russian drones?

The Russians are indeed ramping up production. That's what our intelligence is saying. The number of decoy drones is also increasing. We estimate it's roughly 50-50 or 40-60. Most of them are real, but there are plenty of decoys too. And they complicate our air situation by overloading the air defences. We have to respond to that. And we need to bring them all down somehow – with interceptors, jamming systems and so forth.

All possible means are now being used against reconnaissance UAVs, which are a serious problem. Even Yak-52 aircraft have been used, and interceptor drones – all of these are currently being used across all branches of the defence forces.

Shaheds are practically always targeted by aircraft from the Air Force, army aircraft, and also helicopters. The anti-aircraft missile troops more often engage to deter Russian aircraft and counter cruise missiles.

The weapons we have must be used rationally. But if there's a serious threat to people's lives, a facility or an installation, then an anti-aircraft missile can be used against a UAV.

Then we have the air defences of the Ground Forces.

Then come electronic warfare systems and, in fact, unmanned systems units, which have now also started operating. It hasn’t been long, but we are already seeing some successful interceptions of Shaheds by what are being called anti-aircraft drones. This is being implemented across all branches of the defence forces. I believe it will be scaled up. We need to stay one step ahead.

Shaheds are evolving. At first they simply painted them black. Then they were upgraded with protection against electronic warfare systems, and now it takes more stations to suppress a Shahed. Its antenna now has many components that defend it against jamming. Still, electronic warfare is an effective means of neutralisation. If the drone fails to reach its target, with luck it'll crash somewhere in a field. Electronic warfare systems suppress both missiles and UAVs.

Do electronic warfare systems still work against the latest Shaheds?

They make it harder for them. But people twist things. "Oh, Iskanders are coming, the Patriot system is finished, it’s ineffective, let's get something new." That makes things more difficult, of course. But were six Iskander missiles recently shot down over Kyiv? Yes, they were. Unfortunately not all of them – there were three strikes. But six of them were shot down.

We understand that the new Shahed is an expensive "wing" that costs hundreds of thousands of dollars and cannot, as some experts claim, be launched on Ukraine by the thousand, because a single night could cost billions of dollars.

Open-source data shows the price of a Shahed is US$200,000.

Even if they've managed to cut production costs somewhere, it's still extremely expensive. That's exactly why decoy drones accompany the Shaheds – the ones we talked about, which generally look similar on the radar. But when they come closer, the defence forces can tell the difference visually or by the sound of them, so they know exactly what’s coming, so the appropriate weapon will be used against each target.

"Mobile fire groups are a Ukrainian invention – our own know-how"

We target the decoy drones as well, right? Are they being shot down too?

Of course. They more often end up in the statistics as having disappeared from radar – meaning they go down without major consequences: they run out of fuel, get caught in a tree or structure, and simply crash. Sometimes the decoys even carry explosives. Maybe just a few hundred grams or a kilogram, but that too can pose a threat.

That's why we always warn people: don't touch anything. There have even been reports of toxic substances being found. And yes, such incidents have happened – this isn't made up. So there is a danger.

As for light aircraft, we deploy them against reconnaissance UAVs like Orlans, Zalas and Supercams.

Unfortunately, there is no universal weapon that can solve the problem of all UAVs.

I'd also like to mention mobile fire groups – a Ukrainian invention, our own know-how. They were developed to economise on missiles. We can’t economise on our people, but we also can’t afford to use up the entire stock of guided anti-aircraft missiles on hundreds of Shaheds.

Mobile fire groups weren't very effective at first, but their performance has improved over time thanks to additional equipment – thermal imagers, optical sights, spotlights and so on. The groups started getting results, but now their effectiveness is decreasing.

Seeing how effective these mobile fire groups had become, the Russians changed their tactics: they now launch a huge number of UAVs simultaneously – for example, on the cities of Kharkiv, Dnipro, or Sumy – and from altitudes of 2,000 m or higher, they then dive at high speed towards the target they aim to strike. Yes, their accuracy isn't very high either, but they hit residential buildings, hospitals. And we're seeing horrific consequences. The Shahed is a very dangerous weapon. Some of them carry 90 kg of explosives. That's practically a missile.

About the interceptor drones… How will that work? Will there be a huge number of our drones and theirs in the sky?

The war has long since moved to a technological level where robots are fighting on the ground, and modern technologies are also starting to be used in the air. Whoever controls the air will hold the key to success on the ground. That's what the experience of using aircraft in various wars shows.

But warfare is facing new challenges: in addition to aircraft, we now have drones. Drones controlled from the ground – and others that are no longer controlled from the ground at all, meaning drones that already use artificial intelligence.

These are new challenges that we'll have to face in the future. I don't know whether piloted aircraft will ever be able to compete with robotic systems again, given the current pace of technological development.

One of the biggest foundations donated these drones [interceptor drones – ed.] to us – worth UAH 300 million (approx. US$7.2 million). That includes electronic warfare systems, mobile command posts and satellite communication systems. This equipment was handed over to the Air Force Commands South and East. The technology is being scaled up and will move further into the rear areas. Clearly we can't cover the whole of Ukraine – that's impossible.

So for now it’s only being used in specific areas?

Of course, it's targeted.

Is this already reflected in your statistics?

We'll keep that secret – we don’t want information on this to get out for now. Everything new is immediately picked up and analysed by the Russians, and so on. Let's just say the Air Force is working on that as well. The goal is to protect all cities – especially major urban centres with populations in the millions – and the country's strategic facilities.

We work together with everyone – both foundations and manufacturers. The issue is that this can't happen too quickly.

How many aircraft do we need in order to have an effective Air Force capable of deterring the Russians?

We actually need various types of aircraft. The F-16 is a multirole aircraft. It can operate in the air, and engage aerial targets, ground targets, and even naval targets. Aircraft have different specific roles, as I've just mentioned. There have been assessments of how many aircraft of various types are needed: roughly 200 for effective defence of the country.

So not even a thousand, like we had in the early 1990s?

That figure of a thousand included both flying and non-flying aircraft. Why did Ukraine have so many? During the Soviet era – even alongside the so-called Socialist Bloc countries –  the USSR was still building up both its nuclear forces and carriers of tactical nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory. Strategic bombers like the Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 were stationed in Poltava Oblast.

In addition, many frontline and bomber aircraft were based in the cities of Dubno and Starokostiantyniv. It was a massive air force grouping, intended, if necessary, to be directed at the West.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, some of this fleet simply decayed, some was sold off to African nations and so on. Today, effectiveness is no longer about quantity, but about modernisation and innovation.

Everyone says the missile threat to Ukraine is growing, as Russia is expanding and upgrading its missile arsenal and has now the capacity to purchase weapons from North Korea. What's the solution to this, and is there reason to believe it may only get worse?

It all depends on whether Russia continues to receive support from other countries – and that matters. We know which countries.

We are waiting for effective sanctions from our partners. Despite the significant efforts that have been made to block Russia’s access to Western technology, we keep finding Western components in their weapons.

Russia is able to produce weapons thanks to its revenues from sales of oil, gas and other fossil fuels. That's exactly what Western sanctions should target.

Tetiana Danylenko, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Theodore Holmes and Anastasiia Yankina

Editing: Charlotte Guillou-Clerc and Teresa Pearce